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Feres TO Chappell TO Stanley: THREE STRIKES AND
SERVICEMEMBERS ARE OUT
Jonathan P. Tomes*
To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or
justice.
Magna Carta § 40.
I. INTRODUCTION
With its decision in United States v. Stanley,1 the United States
Supreme Court completed the virtual evisceration of ser-
vicemembers' constitutional rights begun thirty-seven years before
in Feres v. United States.2 Although the courts have never ex-
pressly held that servicemembers do not enjoy the same constitu-
tional rights that other citizens enjoy,s the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Stanley has left servicemembers without an effective
remedy to vindicate their constitutional rights. Rights without
means of enforcing them are meaningless. 4
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., 1968, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati; J.D., 1975, Oklahoma City University. Author of THE SER-
VICEMEMBER'S LEGAL GumE (1987) and The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limi-
tation to Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A.F. L.
REv. 1 (1985). I am grateful to Professors Joan Steinman and Stephen Sepinuck for their
perceptive analyses of the draft of this article. Professor Michael Spak's assistance, analyti-
cal and otherwise, was, as always, invaluable. Thomas Dimitroff's jurisprudential skills,
which were well honed at Oxford, served me well in writing this article as did Kenda Hick's
research assistance.
1. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
2. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
3. The Constitution does, however, expressly exempt cases arising in "the land and naval
forces," i.e., courts-martial, "from the requirement of prosecution by indictment and, infer-
entially, from the right to trial by jury." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969),
rev'd on other grounds, Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). The remaining consti-
tutional rights citizens enjoy, however, would appear to be equally applicable to ser-
vicemembers. The United States Court of Military Appeals, the military's highest appellate
court, see art. 67b. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1988), said:
"[T]he protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary
implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces." United States v.
Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960).
4. "'[R]ights' which cannot be realized are worse than useless; they are traps of delay,
expense and heartache." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9 (7th printing 1981).
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This article demonstrates the flawed jurisprudence of Stanley by
establishing that servicemembers have constitutional rights, and
analyzes the Supreme Court decisions that have disabled aggrieved
servicemembers from enforcing those rights. Finally, the article
demonstrates that Stanley does not advance the utilitarian pur-
poses it was meant to serve.
II. Do SERVICEMEMBERS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
The easy answer is "of course, they do."5 As recently as 1957,
however, Supreme Court Justice Black said, "[a]s yet it has not
been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other
protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials. ' ' 6 A
judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals put it an-
other way: "Does the Bill of Rights apply to service persons? The
question has often been debated, and I guess the best answer is:
Yes, a service person is afforded all the constitutional guarantees
of freedom and liberty envisioned in the Bill of Rights-except
when he does not enjoy them."7
Courts and commentators have done little to settle the confusion
engendered by the paucity of evidence as to what the framers of
the Constitution intended with regard to the rights of members of
the armed forces.8 The only language that expressly exempts ser-
vicemembers from constitutional protections appears in the fifth
amendment's guarantees of prosecution by indictment and trial by
jury." A close analysis of the contemporary practice and the litera-
5. See United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
6. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
7. Cox, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice,
118 Mi.. L. REV. 1, 23 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understand-
ing, 71 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1957). One problem with any attempt to determine whether or to
what extent servicemembers have constitutional rights is that the Uniform Code of Military
Justice ("UCMJ") provides them greater rights in many areas than the Constitution would
require. See Cox, supra note 7, at 23-27. For example, the UCMJ enlarges the sixth amend-
ment rights of military personnel by affording all servicemembers free, appointed defense
counsel. Id. at 26; see arts. 27, 32, 38 & 70 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 832, 838, 870 (1988).
The UCMJ may in fact create a right to counsel for servicemembers which is not guaran-
teed by the Constitution. See Wiener, Courts Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice I, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1958) (opining that the framers never intended the sixth
amendment to apply to courts martial).
9. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
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ture of the framing of the Constitution demonstrates that the bet-
ter view is that all constitutional protections, other than indict-
ment by grand jury and trial by petit jury, apply to those serving
in the armed forces.10
Regardless of whether legal scholars believe that the framers in-
tended for servicemembers to enjoy the protection of the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court now seems to concede that ser-
vicemembers have constitutional rights, even if the exigencies of
military service constrain those rights." Assuming that ser-
danger;, nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
10. Henderson, supra note 8, at 324. Cf. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice II, 72 HARv. L. REv. 266 (1958). Even though Wiener postulates that
the framers did not mean for the Bill of Rights to apply to servicemembers, he explains:
But it does not follow from the foregoing demonstration that the framers of the Bill
of Rights in 1789-1791 never intended its guarantees to apply to persons in the land
and naval forces, that members of those forces must be held to have no constitutional
rights today, or that they must be held to be unable to protect their rights in the
same manner and by the same proceedings that are now available to civilians.
Id. at 294.
Weiner bases this conclusion on a number of factors. First, the Congressional extension of
servicemembers' constitutional rights by statute gives servicemembers virtually the same
rights or greater rights at courts-martial than civilians have in non-military trials. Id. at
295-96. Second, the expansion of the Bill of Rights to include servicemembers is a lesser
advance in constitutional interpretation than was Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (outlawing segregation in the public schools) and will not encounter the commu-
nity opposition which arises when a new doctrine is in opposition to community mores. Id.
at 296-300. Third, the services themselves espouse the view that servicemembers have con-
stitutional rights. Id. at 300. Finally, the composition of today's military differs so greatly
from its beginnings that an approach which denies servicemembers constitutional rights is
wholly inappropriate. Id. at 301-02. Weiner concludes:
I do not rest this proposal [to recognize the constitutional rights of ser-
vicemembers] on any after-readings of the original understanding; I think I have suf-
ficiently demonstrated that the original understanding was quite the other way.
Rather, I place my faith in the oft-demonstrated proposition that the meaning and
scope of the Constitution are not static, but that they change, just as all law
changes. ...
When, in the years to come, the serviceman shall be recognized as having constitu-
tional rights, such recognition will be, not a reflection of original understanding, but a
part of the continuing and continuous process of making law, insuring that, in
Maitland's phrase, "every age should be the mistress of its own law." Just as every
generation makes its own law, so every generation can and must make its own consti-
tutional law.
Id. at 304.
11. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). Holding that enlisted servicemembers
could not maintain a suit for monetary damages against their superior officers for alleged
constitutional violations, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
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vicemembers do have constitutional rights, the real question then
becomes whether they can enforce those rights.
III. THE DOOR TO THE COURTROOM SWINGS SHUT
With United States v. Stanley,12 the door to the courtroom
swung completely shut, foreclosing military members from having
an effective remedy for constitutional torts committed by the mili-
tary. The current limitations on servicemembers' rights to sue the
military for constitutional torts did not, however, begin with a con-
stitutional tort case. Rather, Feres v. United States,1 3 decided
thirty-seven years before Stanley, consolidated three cases brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").14 In Feres, all three
plaintiffs were active duty servicemembers. One had died in a bar-
racks fire allegedly caused by a faulty heating system, and the
other two had suffered from Army surgeons' medical malpractice.1
5
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity for the tortious acts
"[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they
have doffed their civilian clothes." . . . This court has never held, nor do we now
hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for consti-
tutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.
Id. at 304 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188
(1962).
In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the Court recognized that ser-
vicemembers have first amendment rights although the military legitimately can place
greater restrictions on those rights than would be proper in a civilian setting. See also Sec-
retary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (requirement that servicemembers obtain
command approval before circulating petitions on base did not violate first amendment);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force removal of reserve officer who circulated
petition without obtaining the required approval did not violate officer's first amendment
rights); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Army regulations banning partisan political
speeches and distribution of literature by personnel without prior approval deemed consti-
tutional). For an excellent discussion of the effect of Chappell v. Wallace on first amend-
ment rights see Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications of This Retreat for
the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1985).
12. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
13. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988). In the FTCA, the federal government waived sovereign
immunity for certain torts committed by employees of the United States. The FTCA pro-
vides for money damages:
[Flor injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. § 1346(b).
15. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37.
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of its agents and employees has thirteen exemptions.16 One prohib-
its suits based on "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activi-
ties of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time
of war.' 1 7 None of the three Feres cases arose out of combatant
activities in time of war. Nevertheless, in a unanimous opinion, the
Supreme Court held that servicemembers who sustain injuries that
arose out of or were in "the course of activity incident to service"
cannot maintain an FTCA action."'
In reaching that conclusion, the Court stressed the following ra-
tionale. First, since the FTCA created no new causes of action and
since no American law ever permitted a servicemember to recover
for the negligence of the military, the FTCA could not have cre-
ated a caise of action for servicemembers against their military
superiors or the government itself.' 9 Second, since the FTCA uses
the law of the situs of the tort to determine liability,20 and active
servicemembers have no real control over their geographic location,
it made "no sense" to base liability in incident-to-service cases on
the law of the state where the tort occurred.2 Third, since ser-
vicemembers have a comprehensive statutory compensation
scheme of disability and veterans' benefits, Congress did not in-
tend to give servicemembers an additional remedy.2
One might expect that a unanimous Supreme Court decision
would end servicemembers' attempts to recover under the FTCA
for torts that involved their military status. Not only did Feres fail
to preclude hundreds of cases in which servicemembers sought to
avoid its bar on lawsuits for service-connected injuries, 23 it also en-
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
17. Id. § 2680(j).
18. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
19. Id. at 141-42.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
21. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
22. Id. at 140.
23. See Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REv. 24, 42
(Spring 1976) (noting Feres did not halt tort litigation by servicemembers, it simply assured
that they would generally lose); Ziliman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service
Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C.L. REv. 489, 511 nn.129-30 (noting that, upon review of
147 Feres type cases decided between 1955 and 1981, only eight were decided in the plain-
tiff's favor); Note, United States v. Stanley Has the Supreme Court Gone a Step Too Far?,
90 W. VA. L. REv. 473, 476 n.24 (1987) (noting that, of 81 cases between 1981 and October
26, 1987, only eight plaintiffs prevailed); see also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681
(1987) (refusing to allow FTCA action for injuries sustained incident to service but caused
by the negligence of civilian, rather than military, employees of federal agencies); United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (refusing to confine the incident-to-service test to on-
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gendered a storm of criticism.24 This criticism, however, did not
deter the Supreme Court from reaffirming Feres in the spring of
1987. In a five to three decision, the Court in United States v.
Johnson25 held that the United States was not liable under the
FTCA for a Coast Guard officer's injuries sustained during an ac-
tivity incident to his military service even if the cause of his inju-
ries was negligence on the part of civilian employees of the United
States.26 The Court relied on the distinctively federal nature of the
relationship between the government and its servicemembers," the
existence of generous statutory disability and death benefits, 2s and
the impropriety of the judiciary's involvement "in sensitive mili-
tary affairs at the expense of military discipline and
effectiveness."'2 9
Feres and Johnson involved traditional torts, but what about
constitutional torts? Could servicemembers sue for constitutional
wrongs inflicted by military superiors? Perhaps not unsurprisingly,
servicemembers fared no better when they were victims of consti-
tutional torts than when they were victims of traditional torts. In
Chappell v. Wallace,30 for example, a group of black Navy enlisted
men accused their superior officers of racial discrimination and
sought monetary damages as well as injunctive relief. A unanimous
base, on-duty injuries); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (permitting a veteran to
sue for a post-discharge injury); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation (Aguiar
v. United States) 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987) (no recovery for injuries allegedly caused by
exposure to chemical herbicide in Vietnam); Scheppan v. United States, 810 F.2d 461 (4th
Cir. 1987) (no recovery for medical malpractice); Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759
(11th Cir. 1985) (Feres bars recovery from injuries going to or from place of duty); Torres v.
United States, 621 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1980) (no FTCA recovery for wrongful dishonorable
discharge); Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1980) (Feres bars suit for off-
duty, off-base, servicemember volunteer in a training program).
24. E.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV.
316 (1954); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1099 (1979); Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 455 (1969); Note, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed
Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992 (1986) [hereinafter Intramilitary Tort Law];
Cf. Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of "Incident to Ser-
vice," 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 485 (1982).
25. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
26. Id. at 686-88. The Court noted: "Although all of the cases decided by this Court under
Feres have involved allegations of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the
application of the doctrine." Id. at 686.
27. Id. at 689.
28. Id. at 689-90.
29. Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
30. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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Court held that servicemembers could not recover monetary dam-
ages from their military superiors for constitutional torts.31 Al-
though the Court's earlier decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed-
eral Narcotics Agents 2 had authorized suits for damages against
federal officials who had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights,
the Chappell Court reasoned that the language in Bivens limiting
such remedies when "special factors counselling hesitation are pre-
sent"33 made this remedy unavailable to servicemembers: "Taken
together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Estab-
lishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute 'special fac-
tors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide en-
listed military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their
superior officers. '34
The Court concluded that Chappell did not bar servicemembers
from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered
in the course of military service. 5 "But the special relationships
that define military life have 'supported the military establish-
ment's broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvi-
ous reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military author-
ity might have.' ," However, this reasoning ultimately did lead the
Court to preclude servicemembers from obtaining civil remedies
for constitutional torts.
31. Id. at 305.
32. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that persons who suffer violations of their constitu-
tional rights as a result of the actions of a federal official may sue that official for damages
even though no statute authorizes such a suit. For a discussion of the current state of Bivens
lawsuits see Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens
Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 (1988-89).
33. 403 U.S. at 396.
34. 462 U.S. at 304.
35. Id. The Court cited the following cases as examples of situations in which ser-
vicemembers could sue the military: Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (reversing decision
of the court of appeals holding that an Air Force regulation restricting the circulation of
petitions on air force bases violated the first amendment); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974) (upholding articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1970), which
proscribe "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," art. 133, and "disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces," art. 134 against
claims of unconstitutional vagueness); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(holding that statutes which categorized female spouses of male servicemembers as "depen-
dents" for purposes of obtaining quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits, but
failed to similarly categorize male spouses of female servicemembers as "dependents" unless
the latter provided over one-half of the male's support violated the fifth amendment by
unjustifiably affording differential treatment to male and female servicemembers). Signifi-
cantly, none of these suits involved damages.
36. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181, 187 (1962)).
1990]
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IV. THE COURT SHUTS THE DOOR-AND THROWS AWAY THE KEY
United States v. Stanley,3 7 decided thirty-seven years after
Feres, effectively barred servicemembers from redress for constitu-
tional torts committed by the military. While on active duty, Stan-
ley was the victim of an Army program that tested the effects of
Lysergic Acid Diethylamide ("LSD") by secretly administering the
drug to servicemembers who had volunteered for a chemical war-
fare testing program. The drug caused severe personality changes
in Stanley that led to his discharge from the service and to the
breakup of his marriage.38 After his discharge and upon learning
that the military had administered LSD to him, Stanley filed an
FTCA action alleging that the military was negligent in adminis-
tering, supervising, and monitoring the LSD testing program. The
District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that Feres
barred Stanley's negligence claim and granted the government's
motion for summary judgment.39 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit granted interlocutory review and held that although
the Feres doctrine barred his suit against the United States, Stan-
ley had a potential constitutional claim under Bivens, and re-
manded the case to the district court to allow Stanley to amend his
pleadings.40 Stanley amended his complaint to add a constitutional
complaint against unknown individual officers. The district court
reaffirmed its dismissal of the FTCA claim but refused to dismiss
the Bivens claim and recertified its order for an interlocutory ap-
peal.41 Stanley again amended his complaint adding nine individ-
ual federal officers as defendants. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision regarding the constitutional claim but
reasoned that its decision in Johnson v. United States42 might also
37. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
38. Id. at 671.
39. Id. at 672.
40. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 1159-60.
42. 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); see supra notes 23-29 and
accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit had reasoned that the evolution of the Feres doc-
trine warranted a determination of the doctrine's applicability based upon the status of the
alleged tortfeasor. The court declared that the only real rationale for Feres was the "desire
to avoid civilian court inquiry" into matters of the military, which is "a specialized society
separate from civilian society." Id. at 1538 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).
When the tortfeasor was not a member of the military, but rather was a civilian employee of
the government, the court reasoned the Feres rationale did not apply. Id. at 1539. The court
[Vol. 25:93
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allow an FTCA action and remanded the case so the district court
could reconsider whether Stanley had a viable FTCA Claim.4 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that neither of the special factors that
were present in Chappell,44 the unique nature of military disci-
pline and Congress' plenary power to regulate military justice and
the administrative remedies for servicemembers, precluded Stan-
ley's claim. Nor could the administrative remedies for ser-
vicemembers properly compensate Stanley.45 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari because of the lack of uniformity in the courts of
appeals' interpretations of Feres and because the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's reinstatement of Stanley's claim seemed to be an unsound
judicial practice.4
Although all the Justices agreed with Part I of Justice Scalia's
opinion, which found that the procedure the court of appeals used
to reinstate Stanley's claim was improper,41 only four Justices
agreed with Justice Scalia that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Stanley could proceed with his Bivens claims despite Chap-
pelI.45 The Court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit "took an unduly
narrow view of the circumstances in which courts should decline to
permit nonstatutory damages actions for injuries arising out of
military service. ''41
Stanley had contended that Chappell's "special factors counsel-
ling hesitation"-the "need for special regulations in relation to
military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a
special and exclusive system of military justice"5 0-did not apply
in his case for two reasons. First, Stanley said Chappell's special
factors did not apply because the defendants were not his superior
found "absolutely no hint. . . that the conduct of any alleged tortfeasor even remotely
connected to the military will be scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." Id. Thus, the
court found that Feres did not bar the lawsuit. Id.
43. Stanley, 786 F.2d 1490, 1499.
44. 462 U.S. 296 (1983); see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
45. Stanley, 786 F.2d at 1496.
46. 479 U.S. 1005 (1986).
47. 483 U.S. at 676-78. The Court determined that the Eleventh Circuit's remand of Stan-
ley's FTCA claim to the district court for reconsideration was improper. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit accepted an appeal from the order refusing to dismiss Stan-
ley's Biven's claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), from which the court of appeals obtained
jurisdiction, an interlocutory appeal is limited to the particular order and consequently the
court of appeals had no jurisdiction to enter an order relating to the previously dismissed
FICA claim.
48. Id. at 670-71.
49. Id. at 678.
50. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 297, 300 (1985).
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military officers and that fact precluded the adverse effects on dis-
cipline that were present in Chappell and other cases involving the
chain of command.51 Second, Stanley contended that Chappell's
special factors did not apply because no evidence supported the
notion that his injury was incident to service because the nature of
the drug testing program was unknown.2
After briefly noting that the Fifth Circuit had already decided
the incident-to-service question against Stanley, the Court admit-
ted that perhaps his case implicated military chain-of-command
concerns less than did Chappell53-but no matter: "Since Feres
did not consider the officer-subordinate relationship crucial, but
established instead an 'incident to service' test, it is plain that our
reasoning in Chappell does not support the distinction Stanley
would rely on."11 4 The Court also noted "varying levels of generality
at which one may apply 'special factors' analysis, '55 from allowing
suits for egregious officer conduct to disallowing suits by service-
men entirely.56
Where one locates the rule along this spectrum depends on how pro-
phylactic one thinks the prohibition should be (i.e., how much occa-
sional, unintended impairment of military discipline one is willing to
tolerate), which in turn depends upon how harmful and inappropri-
ate judicial intrusion upon military discipline is thought to be. This
is essentially a policy judgment, and there is no scientific or analytic
demonstration of the right answer. Today, no more than when we
wrote Chappell, do we see any reason why our judgment in the Biv-
ens context should be any the less protective of military concerns
51. 483 U.S. at 679; see Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984). In Gaspard, former servicemen sued for damages arising
from their participation in atmospheric atomic weapons testing pursuant to military orders.
In finding that their FTCA and Bivens claims were barred, the court found "it is the need
to avoid the inquiry into military orders, and not the consequences of the inquiry, that
justifies the military exclusion from the FTCA." Id. at 1102. (Emphasis by the court.) The
court stated: "The need for plenary discretion in military affairs and the existence of an
adequate, congressionally-imposed compensation scheme instruct us to avoid either impos-
ing or inquiring into monetary damages when a service person is injured." Id. at 1103. (Cita-
tions omitted, emphasis by the court).
52. 483 U.S. at 680. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the Feres rationale was
most important in cases such as Chappell which involved a senior-subordinate relationship.
Id. at 102-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Stanley, however, the Court did not know what
Stanley's relationship was with those involved in the drug testing program. Id. at 697.
53. Id. at 680.
54. Id. at 680-81.
55. Id. at 681.
56. Id.
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than it has been with respect to FTCA suits .... In fact, if any-
thing we might have felt freer to compromise military concerns in
the latter context, since we were confronted with an explicit con-
gressional authorization for judicial involvement that was, on its
face, unqualified; whereas here we are confronted with an explicit
constitutional authorization for Congress "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," and rely
upon inference for our own authority to allow money damages.
57
The Court noted that Stanley's test for liability, a test that de-
pends on the extent to which a particular lawsuit would call into
question military discipline and decision-making, would require
the same judicial inquiry into military matters as it would to sim-
ply entertain the lawsuit:
Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which
would becloud military decision-making), the mere process of arriv-
ing at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. The
"incident to service" test, by contrast, provides a line that is rela-
tively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive inquiry
into military matters.
We therefore reaffirm the reasoning of Chappell that the "special
factors counselling hesitation"--"the unique disciplinary structure
of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field,"
extend beyond the situation in which an officer-subordinate rela-
tionship exists, and require abstention in the inferring of Bivens ac-
tions as extensive as the exception to the FTCA established by
Feres and United States v. Johnson. We hold no Bivens remedy is
available for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activ-
ity incident to service."' 8
With that language, the Supreme Court ended servicemembers'
chances for vindicating a constitutional tort in court. The Court in
Chappell did imply that servicemembers could seek injunctive re-
lief. 9 Of course, even if a court entertains a suit for an injunc-
57. Id. at 681-82 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14) (emphasis by the Court).
58. Id. at 683-84.
59. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Although the Chappell Court barred damage
awards for constitutional torts to safeguard "the need for unhesitating and decisive action
by military officers," 462 U.S. at 304, injunctions may chill decisionmaking more than dam-
age awards. Peter Schuck, in his book SUING THE GOVERNMENT 14-15 (1983), postulates a
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:93
tion,60 an injunction does not help a servicemember after the harm
has occurred.6 '
In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that, at least insofar as ser-
vicemembers are concerned, constitutional rights are not
"trumps" '6 2 over the military's need for a disciplined fighting force.
"[S]pecial factors counselling hesitation-the unique disciplinary
structure of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in
the field"6" are, in the Court's opinion, more important than indi-
vidual servicemembers' constitutional rights because those special
factors enhance the general welfare by promoting a strong national
defense.
remedial continuum in which declaratory judgments are the least intrusive remedy, followed
by damages awards, and in which injunctions, at the other end of the continuum, are the
most intrusive remedy:
At the "intrusive" end of the continuum are the injunctive remedies. The least intru-
sive of these is the "prohibitory" injunction. Unlike a damage remedy, it does not
leave defendants free to continue wrongful conduct even if they are prepared to com-
pensate victims for the ... cost of misconduct .... Thus, a prohibitory injunction
supplants the decisional autonomy and initiative of officials or agencies, but only to a
limited, specified degree....
The "mandatory" injunction, which requires defendants to take specified affirma-
tive actions, is even more judicially intrusive. . . . With a mandatory injunction, the
court does not simply exclude particular choices from defendants' opportunity set,
leaving them free to adopt any other; it actually displaces defendants' judgment and
substitutes its own.
Id. at 15. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976).
60. But see Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103 n.12, (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
"of course, injunctive relief, a matter of discretion in the district court, could not be used to
obstruct necessary military orders").
61. "An injunction, however, comes to [sic] late for those already injured; for these vic-
tims, 'it is damages or nothing.'" Stanley, 483 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring)). Monetary damages have always been viewed as the traditional remedy for viola-
tions of personal liberty. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979).
62. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
[A] right is by definition a situation in which the individual interest trumps the col-
lective well being .... One has a right to a result if one must obtain that result
despite its effect on the collective good. Rights are based on the superiority of a moral
principle to the policy in question.
Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitu-
tional Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 177, 231 (1984).
63. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
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V. Stanley DOES NOT ADVANCE THE UTILITARIAN GOALS IT
PURPORTS TO SERVE
Stanley would seem, therefore, to be based on a utilitarian prin-
ciple, i.e., that the maximization of the general welfare by promot-
ing a strong national defense outweighs the constitutional rights of
servicemembers 4
When a servicemember enlists in the armed forces, that ser-
vicemember accepts some limitations upon his or her personal au-
tonomy.6 5 However, signing an enlistment contract or accepting a
64. The Supreme Court used a similar utilitarian calculation in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the termina-
tion of disability benefits). See also, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (exclu-
sionary rule need not be applied at an administrative hearing). One commentator has sug-
gested that the Supreme Court has no particular competence in calculating utilitarian
benefits:
[T]he three-factor analysis enunciated in Eldridge appears to be a type of utilita-
rian, social welfare function. That function first takes into account the social value at
stake in a legitimate private claim; it discounts that value by the probability that it
will be preserved through the available administrative procedures, and it then sub-
tracts from that discounted value the social cost of introducing additional
procedures.
The problem with a utilitarian calculus is not merely that the Court may define the
relevant costs and benefits too narrowly. However broadly conceived, the calculus
asks unanswerable questions. For example, what is the social value, and the social
cost, of continuing disability payments until after an oral hearing for persons initially
determined to be ineligible? Answers to those questions require a technique for mea-
suring the social value and social cost of government income transfers, but no such
technique exists....
Finally, it is not clear that the utilitarian balancing analysis asks the constitution-
ally relevant questions. The due process clause is one of those Bill of Rights protec-
tions meant to insure individual liberty in the face of contrary collective action.
Therefore, a . . . decision about procedure, one arguably reflecting the intensity of
the contending social values and representing an optimum position from the contem-
porary social perspective, cannot answer the constitutional question of whether due
process has been accorded. A balancing analysis that would have the Court merely
redetermine the question of social utility is similarly inadequate. There is no reason
to believe that the Court has superior competence or legitimacy as a utilitarian bal-
ancer except as it performs its peculiar institutional role of insuring that libertarian
values are considered in the calculus of decision.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28,
47-49 (1976).
65. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text; see also ToMEs, THE SERVICEMEMBER'S
LEGAL GUIDE 26-42 (1987). Joseph Raz has stated that "an autonomous person is part au-
thor of his own life. . . . A person is autonomous only if he has a variety of acceptable
options available to him to choose from, and his life became as it is through his choice of
some of those options." J. RAz, THE MoRALITY OF FREEDOM 204 (1986). A servicemember's
options are certainly limited by the military mission, his commander's orders, military regu-
lations, and the like.
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commission does not mean that the seivicemember forgoes all in-
terest in himself and in the rights that normally secure those inter-
ests for him. Joining the military means accepting limitations on
one's freedom of action, not accepting the elimination of one's free-
dom of action. For example, the military may compel a ser-
vicemember to obey orders but surely the military cannot compel
him to divorce his wife. This acceptance of limitations upon per-
sonal autonomy comes from the concept of service to the nation. 6
The very definition of a "servicemember" is one who serves for the
greater interests of the society which he is serving. However, what
is called into question by the Court's decision in Stanley is just
how a Supreme Court decision that fails to either compensate for
or deter constitutional torts against servicemembers can advance
the interests of society.
The result of this trilogy of cases, Feres, Chappell, and Stanley,
is to deprive servicemembers who have been victims of constitu-
tional violations during their military service of their chance for
vindication in the courts and to grant virtual immunity from suit
to both military officers and civilian federal officials who violate
servicemembers' constitutional rights.67 The Court's rationale is
that to allow servicemembers the ability to sue for constitutional
torts would jeopardize discipline and harm combat readiness.6 8
Stanley strips servicemembers of their rights to be free from con-
stitutional violations, however, without advancing the very utilita-
rian goals that the Supreme Court relied upon in reaching its deci-
sion.6 9 Rather than advancing the goal of maximizing welfare by
66. See, e.g., Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-68, White Paper, 1986: Values: The
Bedrock of Our Profession 7, 9 (June 1986), cited in Riley, Serve Your Soldiers to Win, 66
Mn.. REv. 11 (1986). The professional Army ethic establishes a duty of service and the sense
of purpose necessary to preserve the nation. The four facets of this ethic include: loyalty to
the Nation, the Army, and the unit; duty; selfless service; and integrity. Id.
67. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 689-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Note, United States v. Stan-
ley: Has the Supreme Court Gone a Step too Far? 90 W. VA. L. REv. 473, 488-89 (1987).
68. See notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
69. A leading constitutional scholar has noted that the Court has used cost-benefit analy-
sis in interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). His thesis states that by interpreting constitu-
tional tort liability under § 1983, and by using tort rhetoric rather than constitutional lan-
guage, the Court dilutes the protections the statute offers to persons who have suffered
violations of their constitutional rights.
Tort rhetoric also operates at a somewhat more subtle level than that of explicit
doctrine: it facilitates the use of cost-benefits analysis. . . . [O]ne can fairly describe
the current judicial perspective on tort law as a "law and economics" approach that
emphasizes either efficiency, loss-spreading, or some combination thereof. Courts tak-
ing this latter approach only recognize those values that can be actually or theoreti-
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strengthening the national defense, this disenfranchisement of ser-
vicemembers harms the defense effort. Further, Stanley thwarts
the public's need to deter constitutional violations by the military.
Nor does the decision further the need for civilian control of the
military.
A. Stanley Does Not Help the Defense Effort
No one can doubt that one of the basic goals of our country is to
"provide for the common defense. ' 70 In The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton: "saw four principal purposes of the union of the States;
of these, two-and the first two at that-were 'the common de-
fense of the members' and 'the preservation of the public peace, as
well against internal convulsions as external attacks.' -7" The Con-
stitution provided the Congress and the President the powers that
were essential to provide for the common defense.72 American
courts have long recognized the need for a well-disciplined military
to defend the country:
To prepare for and perform its vital role, the military must insist
upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civil-
ian life. The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a
long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as
powerful now as in the past.73
The Court itself seems to recognize that this need for a disci-
plined fighting force is the only rationale left for the Feres doctrine
and for the Chappell and Stanley decisions.74
cally quantified. Consequently, constitutional values are often discounted
significantly.
Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719,
1741 (1989).
70. U.S. CONST. preamble. Of course this purpose is for the benefit of society as a whole.
71. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE 176-77 (1974).
72. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. arts. I, § 8; II, § 2.
73. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
74. In United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) the Court discussed the primary ria-
son for the Feres doctrine-the "special relationship" between the government and its
soldiers, "the effects of the maintenance of such suits upon discipline," and the "extreme
results" that might obtain from such claims. Id. at 112. Feres can only be explained on the
ground that the enforcement of army discipline in general is more difficult if the subjects of
discipline can bring suit against persons involved in enforcing discipline. Coffey v. United
States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1972); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (bar-
ring claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act by National Guard officer injured while on
1990]
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Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service mem-
bers against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service
are barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the "type[s] of
claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in
sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and
effectiveness." . . . "[T]o accomplish its mission the military must
foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps." Even if military negligence is not specifically alleged in a tort
action, a suit based on service-related activity necessarily implicates
the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably inter-
twined with the conduct of the military mission. Moreover, military
discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally,
duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits brought
by servicemembers against the Government for service-related inju-
ries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service
and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the
broadest sense of the word.7 5
Contrary to the unsupported conclusions of the courts, military
scholars find coercive discipline (blind obedience to orders to avoid
punishment) to be the least effective means of motivating soldiers
to do their duty. Numerous studies have found that soldiers fight
for two reasons, to protect their comrades and to get home safely.7
Studies conducted during the Korean and Vietnam Wars con-
firmed the "seeming irrelevance" of traditional concepts of disci-
pline.. . . [Tlhese studies found that the basic drive to return home
safely and the intimacy of the group were the primary motivations
under fire. An infantryman's identification with his "buddies"
"[aflthough often at odds with the authority system . . . contrib-
uted to operational effectiveness." The rigidity of discipline actually
duty); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (allowing federal prisoner to recover for
damages from the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act for injuries sustained
while confined and resulting from the negligence of a government employee).
75. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690-91 (1987) (quoting United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis by the court) and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
76. E.g., S. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE 40-41 (1947); 2 S. STOUFFER, A. LUMSDAINE, M.
LUMSDAINE, R. WILLAMs, JR., M. SMITH, I. JANIS, S. STAR, L. COTTRELL, JR., THE AMERIcAN
SOLDIER; COMBAT AND ITS AFTRMATH (1949); Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Perform-
ance, in THE NEW MILITARY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONS 195 (M. Janowitz ed.
1964) [hereinafter Little]. As a platoon leader with the First Cavalry Division in Vietnam in
1969, I can say from personal experience that coercive discipline is the least effective
method of motivating soldiers to fight. Rather, I believe they fight to stay alive, for their
peer group, and to get the job done and go home.
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detracted from morale and military efficiency, and increased dissen-
sion and unrest."
In at least two respects, the military's own doctrine de-empha-
sizes discipline as a major component of combat leadership. First,
military doctrine downplays discipline in that military law requires
servicemembers to disobey illegal orders,"8 because blind obedience
leads to war crimes.79 Second, the military's tactical doctrine em-
phasizes initiative over blind obedience. For example, one of the
Army's key operational concepts is initiative:80
[Initiative] requires a willingness and ability to act independently
within the framework of the higher commander's intent ...
[I]nitiative requires audacity which may involve risk-taki-ig and an
atmosphere that supports it .... In the chaos of battle, it is essen-
tial to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level
because overcentralization slows action and leads to inertia ...
[D]ecentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to
take risks and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in
their subordinates."'
This doctrine seems to make acting independently, within the lim-
its of the mission, the antithesis of blind obedience. Independent
77. Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 383, 408-09 (1985), (quoting Little, supra note 76, at 195) (emphasis in original).
78. United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973) (obedience to orders was
no defense when the defendant knew or should have known that the order to kill unresisting
civilians was illegal); United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (1954) (obedience to orders
was not a defense for a soldier who shot a subdued prisoner); see generally, R. RIVKIN, THE
RIGHTS OF SERVICE1EN 105 (1972); TomEs, supra note 65, at 24-25.
79. Cf. 1R GABRrL & P. SAVAGE, CRISIS IN COMMAND 97-98 (1978) (describing how blind
acquiescence to bad military policies in Vietnam allowed unethical practice to continue).
The court in Calley said: "[The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automa-
ton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person."
Calley 22 C.M.A. at 541, 48 C.M.R. at 26.
80. FIELD MANuAL 100-5, OPERATIONS 2-1 (May 1986) [hereinafter FM 100-5]. The other
operational concepts are depth (striking deep into the enemy rear), agility (acting and react-
ing faster than the enemy does), and synchronization (coordinated action of various units
and weapons systems). Id. at 2-1, 2-2.
81. Id. at 2-2; see also Hirschhorn, supra note 62, at 221:
Modern firepower compels troops to disperse and take cover for protection and the
infantryman is often alone, unable to see what is happening around him and out of
contact with his superiors. To perform effectively, the infantryman must display both
endurance and initiative while frightened, exhausted, disgusted, and beyond the di-
rect supervision of officers.
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action is likely to become even more important in future wars than
in past ones, because the devastating effects of modern weapons
and the vulnerability of communications systems results in the
need to keep troops dispersed.1
2
Decentralization of tactical control forced on land forces has been
one of the most significant features of modern war. In the confused
and often chaotic battlefield environments of today, only the small-
est of groups are likely to keep together, particularly during critical
movements .... Small groups and their leaders must be capable of
going it alone like so many forlorn hopes.8 3
Not only does discipline play a relatively minor role in combat
effectiveness, but little support exists for the proposition that al-
lowing servicemembers to sue for damages for constitutional or
other torts harms discipline. Neither Feres nor Chappell did much
to deter tort suits by servicemembers, 84 although those cases meant
that servicemembers would seldom win. Further, servicemembers
have not hesitated to bring lawsuits under other statutes, such as
the Privacy Act. 5 None of these suits seem to have harmed
discipline.
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members
over the past twenty-five years have degraded the military mission.
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas. Al-
though this litigation has not been particularly productive for the
plaintiffs, service members have vigorously asserted their positions
in direct court actions against high ranking officials. The prolifera-
82. Modern target acquisition systems can locate electronic emanations, such as radios
and radars, easily. FM 100-5 notes that:
Armies based on the Soviet model will attempt to control the electromagnetic spec-
trum through the use of radio electronic combat (REC). They will analyze an oppo-
nent's communications system by signals intelligence (SIGINT) to find the terminals,
links, and relays vital to command and control. Then, following the commander's pri-
orities, they will attempt to destroy or to disrupt those communications.
FM 100-5, supra note 80, at 4-4.
83. ENGLISH, A PERSPECTIVE ON INFANTRY 282-83 (1981).
84. See supra note 23.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). This congressional authorization for servicemember suits, cou-
pled with the language of the FTCA, excepting liability for claims "arising out of the com-
batant activities of the military ... in time of war," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988), indicates
that Congress contemplated servicemember lawsuits. If Congress had felt that such suits
would harm discipline, it could have expressly excepted servicemembers from bringing any
such suits.
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tion of this constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered
substantially with military operations."6
Furthermore, the disruption of military operations and of mili-
tary discipline is no greater than that which occurs when a civilian
sues the military or when a servicemember sues for a nonincident-
to-service injury87 or when a servicemember's defense counsel liti-
gates a constitutional issue, such as the lawfulness of an order, at a
court-martial."8 In all of these cases, a commander, or other mili-
tary superior, will be required to explain or justify his actions
before a judge or jury. The disruption of military operations in
such a civilian-plaintiff case, when a U.S. attorney brings a mili-
tary commander into a federal court to defend his actions or in a
court-martial proceeding when military defense counsel requires
86. Rhodes, supra note 23, at 42; cf. Zillman, supra note 23, at 521-26 (intentional tort
suits cause more serious harm to military efficiency than do negligence suits).
87. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Court fears that military affairs might be disrupted by factual inquiries necessi-
tated by Bivens actions. The judiciary is already involved, however, in cases that im-
plicate military judgments and decisions, as when a soldier sues for nonservice-con-
nected injury, when a soldier sues civilian contractors with the Government for
service-connected injury, and when a civilian is injured and sues a civilian contractor
with the military or a military tortfeasor.
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
General William Westmoreland's defamation suit against CBS involved testimony by
many high-ranking military officials concerning controversial military decisions. See, e.g.,
Jury Told of Order to Cut Troop Count, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at B6, col. 4; CBS
Witness Says General Set Ceiling, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at B4, col. 1; 2 Veterans Tes-
tify on Enemy for CBS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at B3, col. 4.
88. Military courts often review matters that have serious implications for disrupting dis-
cipline. For example, to convict a servicemember of a violation of articles 90, 91, or 92,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-92 (1988), involving disobedience of the order of a commissioned or
a noncommissioned officer, or of any other lawful order or regulation, the prosecution must
prove that the order was lawful. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTs 576 (2d ed.
1920); United States v. Martin, 1 C.M.A. 674, 5 C.M.R. 102 (1952); United States v. Smith, 1
M.J. 156 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Smith, 25 M.J. 545 (N.M.C.M.R. 1987). These
court-martial confrontations may be worse for a commander than testifying in a federal
district court far from the military base.
The chilling effect of potential embarrassment through civilian factual inquires
should not be overemphasized however. First, it is far from clear that disclosures at a
civilian tribunal can bring greater dishonor upon a military officer than disclosures at
a military tribunal, since a military officer may well place greater value on the judg-
ment of his military peers than on that of a civilian judge and jury. Second, intramili-
tary inquiries and courts-martial are not necessarily shielded from civilian scrutiny
anyway.... Court-martial proceedings must be open to the public, unless classified
information would be disclosed.
Note, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doc-
trine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 1004 n.47 (1986).
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the commander to testify is no worse than the disruption that oc-
curs in a constitutional torts proceeding against servicemembers.
However, these civilian lawsuits against the military for similar
wrongs are not perceived as a threat to discipline"9 and the Su-
preme Court reviews courts-martial9 without disrupting discipline.
Clearly, since lawsuits for constitutional torts do not involve the
judiciary in sensitive military matters any more than these other
challenges, a federal court intervention is unlikely to be more dis-
ruptive than the military's own procedures to resolve grievances,
such as an inspector general investigation or a complaint under ar-
ticle 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").9
Further, the Supreme Court has recently given the military a
powerful weapon to enforce discipline-a return to unrestricted
subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. In Solorio v. United
States,92 the Court overturned O'Callahan v. Parker,9 3 which had
held that the military could not court-martial a servicemember for
an off-post offense unless that offense was "service-connected." 94
Now, the only test for court-martial jurisdiction is whether the ac-
cused 5 is a member of the armed forces and whether his crime is
an offense under the UCMJ. 96 One of the Supreme Court's reasons
89. Cf. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 1963). The Court noted that the govern-
ment's contention that allowing prisoners to sue the government would erode prison disci-
pline was more potential than actual. Id. at 163.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1988).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1988).
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding
officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress,
may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint
to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against
whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall ex-
amine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong com-
plained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true
statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.
Id.
92. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
93. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
94. O'Callahan did not define service-connection, but in Relford v. Commandant, 401
U.S. 355 (1971), the Court identified twelve considerations for determining service connec-
tion. Id. at 365. For a discussion of the effect of O'Callahan until the Solorio decision, see
Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction
Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1985); see also Note,
Solorio v. United States: A Return to the Unrestrained Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Mil-
itary Courts, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1023 (1988).
95. The defendant at a court-martial is called "the accused."
96. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450-51. The UCMJ was enacted as part of the Act of May 5, 1950,
ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950). It was thereafter codified as part of title 10 of the United States
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for this expansion of court-martial jurisdiction was to improve dis-
cipline by giving the military the ability to try off-post offenses in
the United States by court-martial.
9 7
Whether or not the Court overrates discipline as a component of
an effective fighting force, the importance of morale cannot be
overstated. The Army's major doctrinal publication states: "Poor
morale can weaken any unit."' As one of the leading theorists on
military doctrine noted:
The art of war is subject to many modifications by industrial and.
scientific progress. But one thing does not change, the heart of man.
In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. In all
matters which pertain to any army, organization, discipline and tac-
tics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic
factor. 9
What happens to servicemembers' morale when they learn that
they cannot obtain redress in the courts for violations of their con-
stitutional rights, rights guaranteed by the very Constitution they
have sworn to uphold and defend?100 "The policy argument for ab-
solute immunity . . . rests on the dubious proposition that a ser-
Code by the Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 47, 70A Stat. 36 (1956). The Military Justice Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968) set up the current military justice system and
there have been only minor modifications since, the most recent being the Military Justice
Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The punitive articles of the UCMJ
comprise arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1988).
97. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 449. Of course, Solorio is consistent with Chappell and Stanley in
that all three cases represent a deference to military authority at the expense of ser-
vicemembers' rights:
[T]he deference to congressional authority represents an abdication of the Supreme
Court's role in reviewing cases that involve servicemember rights....
Recognition of the principle of judicial deference places a premium on military exi-
gencies and subordinates individual rights .... The Solorio decision has reinforced
the Court's propensity for deference and presents a large obstacle for future cases
involving the vindication of servicemember rights.
Note, supra note 94, at 1032-33.
98. FM 100-5, supra note 80, at 2-10.
99. A. Du PIcQ, BATTLE STUDEs: ANciENT AD MODERN BATTLE (1946).
100. Each person who enlists or who is commissioned in the Armed Forces takes the fol-
lowing oath:
I, - , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will obey the orders of the
President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, ac-
cording to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.
10 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (emphasis added).
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viceman is more likely to respect authority when he has no re-
course for the intentional or malicious deprivation of his
constitutional rights." 10 1
In his dissent in United States v. Johnson, Justice Scalia com-
mented on the effect on morale of barring recovery for torts: "After
all, the morale of Lieutenant Commander Johnson's comrades-in-
arms will not likely be boosted by news that his widow and chil-
dren will receive only a fraction of the payment they might have
recovered had he been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time
of his death."'1 2
A belief that no judicial redress exists for constitutional torts
seems even less likely to improve morale. Speaking of cases in
which the court denied victims of atomic bomb testing relief under
Feres, one commentator noted:
Even more than Chappell, these cases touch at the heart of Feres.
The servicemen involved acted under military orders while on mili-
tary maneuvers. And their own government is killing them. They
cannot be expected to support its "larger mission." The Army's de-
sertion of its men will not gain their agreement with its institutional
objectives. Servicemen have been denied relief in order to preserve a
respect for authority that already has been destroyed. Cast aside by
the Feres doctrine, they can only rebel.103
Barring servicemembers from suing for damages for constitu-
tional (and other) torts harms the government's (and its citizens')
interest in maintaining a credible defense force. It also diminishes
military superiors' incentive to uphold their oaths "to support and
defend the Constitution"' 04 because of the lack of a credible deter-
rent to constitutional violations. 105
101. Note, Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts, 80 MICH. L. REv. 312, 328
(1981).
102. 481 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 383, 410 (1985).
104. See supra note 100.
105. See Note, supra note 88, at 1004.
Bivens and its progeny suggest a role for the courts in enforcing constitutional
norms to deter unconstitutional tortious conduct where Congress has not created ade-
quate remedial structures. The military system of compensation and justice presents
such a situation: As an institution, the military is not competent to remedy certain
instances of wrongful conduct.
The purpose of deterrence by public tort remedies is to protect the norms of soci-
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In Chappell, the Court relied on the system Congress had cre-
ated to review servicemembers' complaints and grievances, imply-
ing that military and veterans' benefits were adequate to protect
servicemembers from constitutional torts."' 6 If the very volume of
lawsuits alleging such violations did not shatter that theory, 10  a
close analysis of the remedies servicemembers have would illus-
trate that these remedies are an ineffective deterrent for gross con-
stitutional violations. For example, the article 138, UCMJ, com-
plaint 108 that the Court relied on to provide "for the review and
remedy of complaints and grievances such as [constitutional
torts]" in Chappell °11 requires an aggrieved servicemember to ask
his commander for redress before sending his complaint through
the chain of command, hardly a confidence-inspiring procedure
when the commander is the one who committed the constitutional
tort. Further, those who rely on the forwarding of article 138 com-
plaints to the service secretary to provide some semblance of civil-
ian review ° ought to consider that the service secretaries have
delegated their duties with regard to these complaints to military
subordinates.""
ety governed by civilian law. Although civilian courts may lack a certain competence,
in the sense of knowledge about military discipline, they are generally competent to
weigh evidence on issues of great technical complexity, and they are more competent
than the military to reach a substantively legitimate outcome in deciding when con-
stitutional rights have been violated. The issue at the heart of the Feres doctrine is
this: In the absence of congressional guidance, who will balance the military's disci-
pline interest against civilian and constitutional norms-the courts or the military?
Id. at 1009-10.
In Note, The Death of Wilkes v. Dinsman: "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation" in
Abandoning a Common Law Doctrine, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 179, 201 (1989), the author re-
marks that the great mistake in disallowing challenges to military decisionmaldng is that it
"elevates the supposed need for blind obedience over the need for all individuals, at some
elementary level to be held accountable to one another" (emphasis in original). But see,
Richmond, Protecting the Power Brokers: Of Feres, Immunity, and Privilege, 22 SUFFOLK
U.L. Rav. 623 (1988) which argues that military decision makers should be protected from
potential tort liability.
106. 462 U.S. at 304.
107. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984); Stubbs v. United States,
744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979), afid,
663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Everett v. United States, 492
F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), affd
without opinion, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
108. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1988); see supra note 91 for the text of article 138.
109. 462 U.S. at 302.
110. See Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 1000; Note, Intramilitary Tort
Immunity: A Constitutional Justification, 15 PEPPERDiNE L. REV. 623, 650 (1988).
111. For example, 1 20-12, Army Regulation 27-10 (March 18, 1988), directs the Judge
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Similarly, article 98, UCMJ,112 which makes failure to comply
with the safeguards of the Uniform Code a criminal offense, has
never been used to prosecute a commander or other military super-
visor (or indeed anyone) who has violated a servicemember's
rights. 113 Finally, veterans benefits are inadequate remedies be-
cause they are meager in comparison to damages in tort"4 and
Veterans Administration benefits are not available for ser-
vicemembers who are discharged under other than honorable
conditions. 115
Thus, neither military nor veterans remedies adequately deter
the armed forces from committing intentional or constitutional
torts such as Master Sergeant Stanley suffered:
The Feres doctrine's failure to distinguish between negligent and
intentional or constitutional torts has allowed courts applying the
doctrine to gloss over the possible inadequacies of intramilitary rem-
edies .... Intentional or constitutional torts offend societal norms
in a way that deserves moral condemnation, and an action for dam-
Advocate General, U.S. Army, or his designee, to act on article 138 complaints on behalf of
the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army has probably never seen an article
138 complaint, much less acted on one. This lack of real civilian review to fulfill the deter-
rent function of tort law nullifies the assertion that article 138 is "competent to punish and
deter isolated misconduct of lower level officers that sharply departs from the military's own
norms of behavior." Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 1000. Further, based
on my twelve years' experience as a military attorney, I believe that only a small minority of
servicemembers are aware of article 138. And the one such complaint made against me (long
before I became a military attorney) certainly did not significantly deter me from command-
ing my unit as I saw fit. In fact, I remember throwing the request for redress under. article
138 into the waste basket.
112. 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1988). This article, entitled "Noncompliance with Procedural
Rules," reads:
Any person subject to this chapter who-
(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person
accused of an offense under this chapter; or
(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this
chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused; shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
113. In twelve years as an Army Judge Advocate General's Corps officer, including three
years as a military judge, the author never heard of nor encountered a single prosecution for
a violation of article 98. See H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY § 3-100, at 677-78 (1972);
Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 1002 n.40.
114. See Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 92,
133-37 (1985). Veterans benefits are provided by The Veteran's Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §§
314, 322, 342 (1988). Veterans benefits do not, for example, include damages for pain and
suffering. Howland, supra, at 137.
115. Howland, supra note 114, at 136. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c),(d) (1989) sets forth the types of
discharge that bar payment of veterans benefits.
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ages is a way to vindicate those norms, as well as to compensate the
victim. The military justice system can be expected to fulfill this
function by imposing administrative or criminal sanctions only
where its norms and interests accord with civilian ones. 116
Stanley also impedes another important public goal, civilian
scrutiny and ultimately civilian control over the military. Concern
that judicial review will disrupt military decisionmaking is "a dubi-
ous basis for barring civilian factual inquiries, because there is a
recognized public interest in having a military establishment that
is not entirely closed, monolithic and secretive." 117
In Jaffee v. United States, a case involving exposure to atomic
testing, the court barred an ex-servicemember's suit because
"[m]ilitary decisionmakers might not be willing to act as quickly
and forcefully as is necessary, especially during battlefield condi-
tions, if they know they will subsequently be called into a civilian
court to answer for their actions."118 According to the dissent, the
reason for this bar was to discourage public accountability of the
military." 9
Rather than characterizing appropriate decisionmaking by mili-
tary decisionmakers as "quick" and "forceful" in the absence of a
threat of judicial review, one might equally use the terms "hur-
ried" and "reckless." Although commanders need to make quick
decisions on occasion, they always need to make correct ones. Cur-
rent military doctrine calls for commanders to consult with their
lawyers before making both administrative and tactical deci-
sions. 120 The possibility of civilian review, and judicial liability,
116. Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 1002-03.
117. Id. at 1004. The author adds:
Occasional embarrassment to the military in the area of politics can be justified as
necessary to the ability of Congress to fulfill its constitutional role of military poli-
cymaking. Although the judiciary is not charged with the same active oversight of
executive branch affairs, it is far from clear that the interest of an executive agency in
avoiding embarrassment justifies immunity from investigation in a judicial
proceeding.
Id. at 1004 n.49 (emphasis in original).
118. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). Of course, that por-
tion of the court's language concerning the battlefield ignores the FTCA's exclusion for
claims arising out of combat activities during time of war. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
119. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1250 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
120. See Tomes, Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes, MILITARY REvIEw 37, 42 (No-
vember, 1986). Article 6 of the UCMJ, requires convening authorities (commanders who
have the authority to establish courts-martial) to "at all times communicate directly with
their staff judge advocates or legal officers in matters relating to the administration of mili-
tary justice. . . ." 10 U.S.C. § 806(a) (1988).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"means only that an additional factor, the true cost of war. . . will
enter into the decisionmaking process." '121 Forcing commanders to
think about conserving the fighting force, to make the human cost
part of tactical planning, is entirely consistent with tactical doc-
trine.122 Even if possible judicial scrutiny chills decisionmaking,
such scrutiny is preferable to the involuntary administration of
LSD or unnecessary exposure of service personnel to the effects of
an atomic blast.123
Rather than chilling decisionmaking, judicial scrutiny may incul-
cate values that will lessen abuses by the military. As one commen-
tator noted: "Allowing constitutional suits is particularly impor-
tant because these suits will promote the transfer of the dominant
civilian values that are least reflected in the military. The military
professional corps will become more responsive to civilian values,
which will increase internal civilian control." '124
In sum, federal court abstention from servicemembers' constitu-
tional tort cases harms the national defense by overemphasizing
coercive discipline at the expense of morale, by failing to deter mil-
itary superiors from infringing on the constitutional rights of ser-
vicemembers and civilians, and by lessening civilian control over
the military. Barry Bennett sums it up well:
The lesson of the Feres doctrine's newest victims also must be
broadly learned. Their cases reach to the very heart of our laws, our
121. Bennett, supra note 77, at 419.
122. FM 100-5, lists seven combat imperatives:
1. Insure unity of effort.
2. Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.
3. Designate and sustain the main effort.
4. Sustain the fight.
5. Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.
6. Use terrain and weather.
7. Protect the force.
FM 100-5, supra note 80, at 2-6 (emphasis added).
The discussion of the seventh factor notes: "Successful commanders preserve the strength of
the force. They do so by assuring security, keeping troops healthy and equipment ready, and
sustaining discipline and morale." Id. at 2-10.
123. In Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), a former servicemember
sued federal officers for injuries resulting from exposure to fallout from nuclear weapons
testing. The court relied on Feres, in dismissing his Bivens cause of action. Id. at 1098-1100.
Similarly, the court in Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 972 (1982), denied a Bivens action against military superiors who ordered plaintiff
to stand in a field close to a nuclear detonation without any protective equipment.
124. Howland, supra note 114, at 146.
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society, and our humanity .... A legal system that dismisses the
veterans' appeal to its laws must ask where it stands among the
world's systems of justice. And a society that rejects their claim on
its humanity must ask what place it holds among the world's
civilizations.'25
B. Stanley Also Violates Public Tort Theory
Traditionally, the law of torts has had three goals: compensation,
deterrence, and retributive justice.126 All three goals support a util-
itarian jurisprudence. Thus, under the Anglo-American law of
torts, a tort victim can recover damages to compensate him for his
loss, to deter the tort-feasor or others similarly situated from com-
mitting future torts, and, in some cases, to punish the tort-fea-
sor.127 Obviously, society in general has a utilitarian interest in
compensating those of its members who are victims of torts and in
deterring those who might commit torts from so doing, whether
the tort-feasor is an individual or the government.
Public tort law then is meant to provide remedies for citizens
that have been harmed by the activity of government officials.128 It
"attempts to encourage vigorous conduct of governmental activi-
ties while compensating victims of those activities and deterring
wrongful conduct by officials. '12
9
Obviously, however, not all persons are liable in tort. A person
may be subject to liability in tort if he has caused harm to another,
if he has failed to perform his duty to protect'another dependent
on him, or if something in his possession or something or someone
over whom he has control has caused harm to another. 30 Of
course, in many cases, several bases of liability exist. When a com-
mander harms a servicemember, for example, he may also fail to
125. Bennett, supra note 77, at 421.
126. See generally, Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 72, 72-73 (1942).
127. Id.
128. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 35-129
(1970). "Public tort law is the system of substantive norms, procedural rules, and remedial
opportunities that citizens may invoke to redress harm that public officials cause to their
person, property, or other noncontractual interests." SHUCK, supra note 59, at xiv.
129. See Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 997. Another commentator
identifies five primary social goals for public tort law- "to deter wrongdoing, to encourage
vigorous decisionmaling by officials, to compensate victims of official misconduct, to exem-
plify society's moral principles, and to achieve institutional competence and legitimacy."
SCHUCK, supra note 59, at 16.
130. Seavy, Principles of Torts, supra note 126, at 74.
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perform a duty to protect him. But it must be asked whether a
commander or other military superior has a duty to protect those
under his control. Many articles of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice131 indicate that he has such a duty: article 31 prohibits
compulsory self-incrimination; article 37 prohibits illegal command
influence; article 55 prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; arti-
cle 93 makes cruelty toward or maltreatment of a subordinate
criminal; article 97 prohibits unlawful detention; and article 98
makes failure to comply with procedural rules in criminal matters
an offense. Further, a military superior's oath "to support and de-
fend the Constitution"1 "2 would seem to require him to avoid vio-
lating his military subordinate's constitutional rights.
The result of these decisions that bar servicemembers from re-
ceiving damage awards for constitutional torts is to deny these vic-
tims compensation for their injuries, a compensation that the
FTCA itself would seem to favor:
The Tort Claims Act reflects a strong public policy, recognized by
Congress, to protect the citizenry from torts committed by the pub-
lic servants, to lift the risks that may be ruinous if left to lie upon
the individual victim of the particular accident ... and to achieve
an allocation and apportionment of the loss among not a relatively
small segment of the consuming public, but among the entire federal
taxpaying public.133
Although the Court in Johnson based its decision, in part, on
the "generous statutory disability and death benefits"'134 of the
Veterans Benefits Act,135 that Act does not encompass constitu-
tional torts that do not result in disabling injury.13  Unlike the sit-
uation in Chappell, 37 no intramilitary compensation system pro-
131. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1988).
132. Id. § 502; see supra note 100.
133. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254, 274 (D. Utah 1968).
134. 481 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1987) (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950)).
135. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-363 (1988). The Act provides compensation similar to workman's
compensation statutes with fixed rates depending on the degree of injury.
136. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 702 n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See Donaldson, Constitutional Torts and Military Effectiveness: A Proposed Alter-
native to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L. REV. 171, 198-99 (1982-83).
137. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). Chappell relied on UCMJ article 138 and the Board for Correc-
tion of Naval Records. Id. at 302-03. (For a discussion of UCMJ article 138, see supra notes
91, 108-11 and accompanying text.) The latter could order retroactive back pay and retroac-
tive promotion to correct alleged race discrimination by superior officers. Id. at 303.
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vides a remedy for the constitutional tort suffered by Stanley 38 or
for future victims of intentional constitutional torts. "[A]ction[s]
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees.' 1 39 If the purpose of the military is to
protect society,140 society ought to bear at least a portion of the
burden of compensating those injured by the military's constitu-
tional torts, including military as well as civilian victims.
Products liability law operates on the premise that consumer inju-
ries are part of the cost of doing business. Similarly, service-con-
nected injuries should be viewed as part of the nation's cost of de-
fense. It is difficult to see why the injuries of those working for the
whole should be borne exclusively by the individual. 41
Just as Stanley fails to fulfill the objective of victim compensa-
tion, it also fails to act as a deterrent upon tort-feasors within the
military establishment from committing intentional or constitu-
tional torts. Deterrence of government officials is more important
than deterrence in general because abuses of public power threaten
the integrity of the government itself.142 Justice Brandeis noted
that:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imper-
illed if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 143
138. Stanley, 48 U.S. at 691 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court in Stanley found
that an award of back pay and promotions, provided by a board of correction of military
records, was "meaningless" for Stanley because rather than seeking such remedies, he was
seeking damages for mental illness and physical pain. 574 F. Supp. 474, 485 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
139. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (extending only qualified immunity
from Bivens suits to F.B.I. agents) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
140. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
141. Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Personnel: An End to Congressional Acquies-
cence?, 6 LAw Amm INEQUALrrY 153, 181 (1988) (footnote omitted) (citing Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 683 (Iowa 1970) for the proposition that prod-
uct liability's purpose "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers.. . rather than by the injured persons who are power-
less to protect themselves").
142. ScHucK, supra note 59, at xi.
143. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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As previously discussed, 4 4 military remedies are inadequate to
deter military officials from violating servicemembers' constitu-
tional rights. Although the military justice system may sanction
misconduct that departs from its own norms, the system fails to
deal with widespread departures from civilian or constitutional
norms.145 Such a result is inevitable in a justice system that is run
by the very commanders who commit constitutional violations. Af-
ter all, in the military, commanders, not lawyers, decide which
cases go to court. 41
Thus, Feres, Chappell, and Stanley fail to accomplish the goals
of public tort law because they neither compensate victims of con-
stitutional torts nor effectively deter military misconduct.
At best, the Court's approach [in Stanley] remits servicemen to in-
adequate statutory remedies; at worst it sanctions complete depriva-
tion of their constitutional rights. It is regrettable that those who
serve and protect our nation and the Constitution upon which it is
founded are stripped of the same rights we cherish for ourselves. 147
This critique of the Court's decision in Stanley could end at this
point because the decision clearly does not accomplish the utilita-
rian goals the Court intended it to serve. But a further question
deserves consideration: Where do servicemembers and ser-
vicemembers' rights fit into our system of jurisprudence?
144. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
145. See Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 24, at 1002-03.
Of course, many of these servicemembers will return to civilian life with values they ac-
quire while in the military, including negative values such as a lack of respect for constitu-
tional rights. Over the past ten years, the military has reported that of approximately
3,000,000 servicemembers eligible to reenlist in the armed forces, 1,600,000 did. Therefore,
1,400,000 did not reenlist and returned to civilian life after their initial term of service.
MILITARY MANPOWER RECRUITING AND REENLISTMENT RESULTS FOR THE AcTivE COMPONENTS
(1979-1988). Most of those that did reenlist eventually returned to civilian society.
146. Rule 601(a), Rules for Court-Martial (R.C.M.), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, provides that "referral is the order of a convening authority that charges against an
accused will be tried by a specified court-martial." The UCMJ specifies that the President,
service secretaries, and various commanding officers may convene courts-martial. 10 U.S.C.
§ 822 (1988). These commanders must receive advice from lawyers (judge advocates). Id. at
§ 806(b). Ultimately, though, the commanders decide whether to prosecute a case, Rule
601(d), and who comprises the court members (military jurors). Id. § 825(d)(2). This type of
command control may result in illegal command influence. See United States v. Cruz, 25
M.J. 326 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Levite, 25 M.J. 334 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v.
Thomas, 22 M.J. 388 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987).
147. Comment, The Supreme Court: Leading Cases, 1986 Term, 101 HARv. L. REv. 270,
361 (1987).
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VI. Stanley AND JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORY
The preceding section demonstrated that the utilitarian reason-
ing that the Court employed in Stanley will not yield the result
the Court intended it to have. This section will demonstrate that
even if the Court had arrived at the conclusion which a proper ap-
plication of the utilitarian calculus demands, such a calculus vio-
lates constitutional rights in particular and the "public culture"
which gives those rights their meaning.
Whether one approaches the analysis of constitutional rights
from a utilitarian, libertarian, or communitarian standpoint, one
cannot doubt the importance of rights14 to the founders of our
country, for they said, "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Cre-
ator with certain inalienable rights.
149
[W]ithin the political culture shared by men of property in 1787, the
establishment of justice meant more than anything else the protec-
tion of rights. Natural rights, inalienable rights grounded in natural
law; and above all, the rights to life, liberty, and property were at
the core of the conception of justice. 150
The framers based the Constitution on John Locke's individual-
istic conception of natural rights.
For Locke, the rights to life, liberty, and property authorize people
to pursue their own projects as they see fit provided that their activ-
ities do not violate the rights of others. Rights protect people from
others' unwarranted incursions, but they do not supply any positive
148. A right is a "power, privilege, faculty, or demand, inherent in one person and inci-
dent upon another," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (6th Ed. 1990). Joseph Raz defines a
right as:
"X has a right" if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an
aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other
person(s) to be under a duty.
Note that since "a right" is a very general term, one rarely asserts that someone
has a right without specifying what rights he has, just as one does not normally men-
tion that a person is subject to a duty without saying something more about what
duty it is.
RAz, supra note 65, at 166.
149. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
150. Mazor, The Purposes of the Constitution, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
CONsTrruTION 40 (D. Meyers & K. Kipnis eds. 1988).
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benefits. People are entitled to noninterference . . but people are
not entitled to aid. Likewise, natural rights are equal rights since all
people possess these rights and since no one's rights are weightier
than anyone else's. But Locke regarded the equality of natural
rights as formal rather than substantive. Respecting natural rights
does not require equality of outcomes; it requires observing impar-
tial procedures.
This Lockean view of rights continues to dominate jurisprudence
in the United States. Constitutional rights are seen as negative
rights that guarantee spheres of personal liberty by forbidding un-
warranted forms of government interference .... 151
Certainly Master Sergeant Stanley sought to vindicate the as-
sault on his negative right, the right to be free from government
inflicted intentional bodily injury.152 But his inability to vindicate
the harm to that right suggests that the Lockean view of rights
may not dominate current American jurisprudence. One might ar-
gue that the utilitarian goal of maximizing public welfare even at
the expense of individual rights has overtaken rights-based juris-
prudence in today's society. As Professor Schwartz explains:
When the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written, gov-
ernment was only an arbiter, allowing the individual to go unre-
strained except at extreme limits of conduct. In the almost two cen-
turies that followed, the system gradually shifted to one in which
the government had a positive duty to promote the welfare of the
community, even at the cost of individual rights. From a constitu-
tional, as well as from a political view, the welfare state has become
an established fact....
In the welfare state, however, the emphasis inevitably shifts from
liberty to equality. John Stuart Mill gives way to John Maynard
Keynes and the primary function of the legal as of the social order
becomes distributive. With the acceptance of those views that hold
forth that the economic burdens incident to life must increasingly
be borne by the society to ensure the individual at least the mini-
mum requirements of a decent human life, the society assumes a
151. Meyers, Introduction to Part Four, Current Issues in Constitutional Law in PHILO-
SOPHicAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 155 (D. Meyers & K. Kipnis eds. 1988).
152. It matters little, however, whether the right involved is a negative right, such as
freedom from bodily injury, or a fundamental liberal right such as the right to free speech,
because Stanley, read with Chappell v. Wallace, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), indicates that ser-
vicemembers cannot vindicate any constitutional torts with monetary damages.
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new distributive role. Its laws must likewise follow in this new
path.153
Thus, one may argue that the legal and social order of the
United States has moved from the pre-eminence of natural rights
to the utilitarian view that the benefits of society should be dis-
tributed in a way that maximizes welfare.154 A utilitarian looks at
the practical consequences, the utility, what works, as the main cri-
teria for judicial decisions, not individual rights. 55 If a utilitarian
would grant people a right, that right must be one that maximizes
the general welfare rather than one that overrides considerations of
the general welfare.
Yet simply incorporating rights into our overall utilitarian
calculus of general welfare does not make those rights the limita-
tions on governmental power which are characteristic of a liberal
democracy. Alternatively, an individualistic conception of rights,
one in which rights merely act to check the government and others
from invading individual rights, yields an impoverished moral
landscape wholly unable to account for certain collective goods
which give rights their meaning.15 8 "Asserting a right is more than
153. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANIND 226 (1977). Mazor notes that:
As early as the controversy over the National Road and as late as the debate over the
New Deal it was argued that neither the taxing power nor the Commerce Clause was
so broad as to allow the federal government to engage in vast projects or assume a
general superintendence of the economy in order to ensure the well-being of the peo-
ple as a whole. But the utilitarian perspective . . has found increasing favor. The
area of dispute has become instead the question of how much and what kind of inter-
vention should be made by the national government.
Mazor, supra note 150, at 50.
154. The framers of the Constitution were not, however, adverse to the utilitarian idea of
promoting the general welfare. The preamble to the Constitution lists promoting the general
welfare as one of the reasons for establishing the Constitution. James Madison stated in
THE FEDERALIST, No. 45, at 289 (J. Madison) (C. Rossitur Ed. 1961), that "[t]he public good,
the real welfare of the great body of people, is the supreme object to be pursued."
155. The classic utilitarian texts are J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789) and J.S. MILL, UTmrrARIANism (1957).
156. For a contemporary account of an individualistic conception of rights see R. NozICK,
ANARCHY. STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Nozick rejects the utilitarian principle that a right must
be one that maximizes the general welfare rather than one that overrides consideration of
the general welfare because it does not sufficiently account for the rights of individuals. He
envisions a concept of individual autonomy which assumes that an individual is free when
he is not interfered with by the state or other members of society. This definition of free-
dom is based on the concept that the individual is free to do other than he did when he had
the ability to do so, given the same circumstances. This conception of individual autonomy,
and the rights which protect it, stem from Nozick's fundamentally Kantian position that
persons should never be treated as the means to other ends but rather as ends in them-
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issuing an injunction. Such an assertion has an essential concep-
tual background-some notion of the moral worth of certain
properties or capacities without which it would not make sense. '157
Joseph Raz, in The Morality of Freedom,15s argues that the An-
glo-American liberal tradition is pursuing a culture in which auton-
omy is a fundamental value. Constitutional rights merit protection
not because they are of inherent value. Rather, their enforcement
fosters a public culture upon which our autonomy is predicated
and defined. According to Raz, rights are the ground of duties in
others. 15 Thus, a right does not exist unless the interest of the
right-holder is sufficient to hold another to be obligated to uphold
that right. e0  I
Which duties a right gives rise to depends partly on the basis of that
right, on the considerations justifying its existence. It also depends
on the absence of conflicting considerations. If conflicting considera-
tions show that the basis of the would-be right is not enough to jus-
tify subjecting anyone to any duty, then the right does not exist.'61
Raz's concept of liberty is also based on an ideal of personal au-
tonomy, an autonomy that is possible only if various collective so-
cietal goods are available.
A right to autonomy can be had only if the interest of the right-
holder justifies holding members of the society at large to be duty-
selves. Nozick's conception of rights, in turn, stems from a polemic against utilitarian or
"end state" political theories which seek to maximize society's overall welfare at the expense
of individual autonomy. As such, Nozick advocates a conception of rights as "side con-
straints" on the actions of the state and other individuals. These side constraints, then,
preserve individual autonomy. But Nozick's conception of rights as side constraints and in-
dividual autonomy is incomplete within the context of servicemembers' rights because it
does not account for the total harm which is suffered by both the service member and the
community at large.
157. C.E. Taylor, Atomism, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (1981).
158. RAz, supra note 65.
159. RAz, supra note 65, at 167. Raz does not say that for every duty there is a corre-
sponding right. He distinguishes the views of Richard Brandt who defines rights in terms of
obligations, see R. BRANDT, ETHIcAL THEORY 438 (1959), by noting that a right of one person
is not a duty on another. "It is the ground of a duty, ground which, if not counteracted by
conflicting considerations, justifies holding that other person to have the duty." RAz, supra
note 65, at 171. Further, he contends that the dynamic nature of rights, their ability to
create new duties based on changed circumstances, could not exist if rights were based only
on duties as opposed to grounds of duties.
160. RAz, supra note 65, at 180-84.
161. Id. at 183.
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bound to him to provide him with the social environment necessary
to give him a chance to have an autonomous life. Assuming that the
interest of one person cannot justify holding so many to be subject
to potentially burdensome duties . . . it follows that there is no
right to personal autonomy."6 2
Consequently, Raz's concept of rights rests on the importance of
those rights to the public good. When harm to an individual jeop-
ardizes the public good, then that harm also harms the community.
When the military administers LSD to a servicemember, that harm
also endangers the community, if for no other reason than because
permitting the military to harm servicemembers lessens the re-
straints that protect the remaining citizenry from such abuses.
"Constitutional rights contribute [to avoiding such harm]. They
are part of the institutional protection of the basic political culture
of a society.' 1 63 Raz continues: "Fundamental liberal rights deserve
special protection and recognition: that is, they are valid moral
rights deserving legal-institutional protection over and above the
normal legal protection, because they express values which should
form a part of morally worthy political cultures.' 1 64 Under this
theory, the only way to guarantee personal autonomy is for the
courts to enforce individuals' rights to preserve the public good.
Ronald Dworkin's rights-based jurisprudence, however, contends
that rights can, in some circumstances, be "trumps" over the gen-
eral welfare.
We need rights . . . only when some decision that injures some
people nevertheless finds prima-facie support in the claim that it
will make the community as a whole better off on some plausible
account of where the community's general welfare lies. But the most
natural source of any objection we might have to such a decision is
that, in its concern with the welfare or prosperity or flourishing of
people on the whole, or in the fulfillment of some interest wide-
spread within the community, the decision pays insufficient atten-
tion to its impact on the minority .... We want to say that the
decision is wrong ... because it does not take the damage it causes
to some into account in the right way and, therefore, does not treat
these people as equals entitled to the same concern as others. 6 5
162. Id. at 247.
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id. at 262
165. Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 211
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As we have seen, the founding fathers meant for one minority,
servicemembers, to have the inalienable rights that the framers of
the Constitution added in the Bill of Rights.166 But, as Raz demon-
strated, servicemembers cannot have rights unless those rights es-
tablish duties in others.1 67 If rights are the reciprocal of duties, and
servicemembers are prevented from exercising their rights, what
does this disenfranchisement of servicemembers say about their
status in society? According to Raz, only members of the same
moral community can have rights.6 " If servicemembers do not
have enforceable rights, then they must not be members of the
same moral community. The result of Chappell and Stanley is
that one group, the group that is sworn to defend constitutional
rights, are apparently not of sufficient value for the courts to pro-
tect their rights. Thus servicemembers are excluded from the
moral community they are to defend. One would hope that ser-
vicemembers do have some value that is derived from their contri-
bution to society. Apparently however, the Court does not think
that the societal status of the individual members of the armed
forces is sufficient to ground a duty in the military to avoid violat-
ing servicemembers' rights.
Further, although servicemembers give up a degree of autonomy
when they enter the armed forces,169 they do not give up all auton-
omy. According to Raz, "[a] person is autonomous only if he has a
variety of acceptable options available to him to choose from, and
his life became as it is through his choice of some of these op-
tions.' 117 0 One reason that Stanley is harmful is because the deci-
sion allows the government to restrict servicemembers' autonomy
beyond the degree that they surrender it when they join the ser-
vice."' That harm is not the only harm Stanley causes. Raz con-
tends that the social conditions which constitute the options re-
quired.for autonomy are collective goods.7 2 The existence of the
(1981). Dworkin does not believe that a right is a right "unless it overrides at least a margi-
nal case of a general collective justification." DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 366. By this stan-
dard, Stanley appears to say that servicemembers do not have rights rather than merely
saying that they cannot enforce them in the federal courts.
166. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 158-61.
168. RAZ, supra note 65, at 176.
169. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; see also Tomes, supra note 65, at 26-
42.
170. RAZ, supra note 65, at 204.
171. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
172. RAZ, supra note 65, at 206.
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armed forces is a collective good because they secure and protect
the existence of the liberal democratic state. If personal autonomy
is desirable, the military is desirable so long as there is a need to
protect society's freedom and autonomy. With its decision in Stan-
ley, the Supreme Court dishonored the collective good by failing to
guarantee personal autonomy as well as by dishonoring a rights-
based jurisprudence such as the framers of the Constitution con-
ceptualized in formulating the Bill of Rights.
By denying servicemembers a forum to vindicate their constitu-
tional rights, the Supreme Court injures society in several ways.
First, the policy reduces servicemembers to second-class citizens
who cannot enforce for themselves the constitutional rights that
they are sworn to defend. Second, it fails to inculcate the military
with the values that our system of government and our society re-
quire. Third, it allows a powerful governmental entity to flout con-
stitutional rights with impunity.
By denying servicemembers redress for constitutional violations,
the Supreme Court has made them into second class citizens. As
Dworkin notes:
There is inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, and so
a standing risk of a distinct form of public injustice .... If this
judgment is unfair, then the community has inflicted a moral injury
on one of its members because it has stamped him in some degree or
dimension an outlaw. The injury is gravest when an innocent person
is convicted of a crime, but it is substantial enough when a plaintiff
with a sound claim is turned away from court .... 27
The Court has turned servicemembers into second class citizens
out of a belief that the need for discipline in the military is
grounded in the military's nature as being separate and distinct
from the civilian world.17 4 To the Supreme Court, at least, "sepa-
rateness connotes the isolation of the military and its personnel
from civilians and civilian institutions."1" 5 But not everyone agrees
with the Court's position:
The Court's assumptions about the military are open to criticism.
173. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EtpmE, 1-2 (1986) (emphasis added).
174. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
175. Howland, supra note 114, at 105.
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First, changes in the military-civilian dichotomy and the military's
disciplinary needs following World War II render the Court's hands-
off policy and the treatment of the military-as separate and differ-
ent-unjustifiable. Second, the present relationship between mili-
tary and civilian society, and contemporary disciplinary needs may
not favor continued adherence to the hands off-policy.
176
The Court apparently still perceives servicemembers as it did
before World War II when the military had little prestige and its
members were kept isolated from civilian society so as not to con-
taminate it. 177 Since World War II, however, the size of the mili-
tary has increased drastically to more than two million ser-
vicemembers in 19891"8 the military has become a dominant force
in; the economy; 179 and it has become a huge civilian-like bureau-
cracy in which most servicemembers serve in non-combat
functions.180
As the number of persons in military-type roles-the "primary
sector"-dwindled, the number of persons holding "secondary sec-
tor" occupations, calling for technical skills, increased. Recently, the
"tertiary," or administrative sector, has experienced an even larger
increase, which reflects the progressive transfer of fighters to desk
jobs. As a result, the "boundary between what is properly military
and what is properly civilian, once so clear, has been blurred to a
point where it hardly exists any longer. Resources the military still
commands are used to attain goals with only a very loose relation to
the primary mission."
Thus, by the time of the Supreme Court's switch to a hands-off
policy after World War II, the military had developed into an insti-
tution that was by no means totally separate and different from
large civilian institutions. The Court's argument that the military's
separateness and differentness supports the hands-off policy is
wrong. Rather the evolution of the military should have led the
176. Id. at 106.
177. Id. (citing C. COATES & R. PELLEGRIN, MILITARY SOCIOLOGY 44 (1965); M. JANowrrz,
WORKING PAPER ON THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER AND POLITICAL PoWEP. A THEORETICAL ORi-
ENTATION AND SELECTED HYPOTHESES 7 (1953)).
178. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY 1989, CHAP-
TER II, MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY (1989).
179. Howland, supra note 114, at 107.
180. Id. at 107-08.
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[C]ourt away from, not toward, a hands-off doctrine.' 8 '
If servicemembers are an integral part of American society, they
ought to have the same rights as other members of society, and the
military ought to respect these rights. Raz contends that What du-
ties one owes to another expresses the respect owed them:
The duties one owes a right-holder derive from or express respect
for him as a person. Rights, one may say, are based neither on the
right-holders' interest, nor on that of others. Rather, they express
the right-holders' status as persons and the respect owed to them in
recognition of that fact.8 2
This respect for individuals is, or ought to be, the very founda-
tion of our judicial system. "Democratic government and judi-
cially-enforced minority rights are both based upon a single con-
ception of respect owed to every individual by the government."1 3
If the military does not respect its own members, how can our
country or our courts expect it to respect the constitutional rights
of outsiders, such as civilians or enemy prisoners who are entitled
to humane treatment under the Law of War?18 4
A military establishment has at its command physical force beyond
the resources of any police agency, and, unlike the civil authorities,
it normally employs force against hostile societies without regard to
the individual fault of any member of society. Both its strength and
its doctrine make it able, in effect, to wage war against its own peo-
ple in disregard of law.'
Thus, unless the courts force the military to respect the values
embodied in the Constitution, and to be a part of American society
instead of apart from it, servicemembers risk more involuntary
181. Id. at 109-10 (quoting Lang, Trends in Military Occupational Structure and Their
Political Implications, in WORLD PERSPECTES ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY 63 (G.
Kourvetaris & B. Dobratz eds. 1977)).
182. RAz, supra note 65, at 188.
183. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 917 (1979) (emphasis added).
184. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135.
185. Hirschhorn, supra note 62, at 214.
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participation in LSD experiments and more planned exposure to
nuclear testing, as well as other, perhaps as yet unknown, terrors.
And, we cannot be certain that the military will limit these viola-
tions to servicemember victims. Thus, preventing servicemembers
from suing for constitutional torts harms the utilitarian pursuit of
the collective well-being'"6 and endangers the rights-based inter-
ests of our servicemembers.
The Court must be the ultimate enforcer of constitutional rights.
Marbury v. Madison8" "gave birth to the Federal common-law
doctrine of judicial review, which designated the Court as the ulti-
mate arbiter of the Constitution, empowered to hold that govern-
mental acts found to be inconsistent with the Constitution and Bill
of Rights are unconstitutional."' According to Professor Hirsh-
horn, servicemembers can count on neither the political branch nor
military discipline to enforce constitutional rights:
Civilian political control, and the restriction of military discipline to
a distinct segment of society, restrict [the military's] will and ability
to use that power [to wage war against its own people]. There is no
perfect security against this, but the best available is to keep legal
sanctions against members of the general community under the di-
rect control of the branch most able to protect individual
rights-the judiciary. As long as the civil courts control the govern-
ment's power of coercion against the individual, the war power can-
not be used to destroy the public consent which restrains and legiti-
mizes it.'89
186. RAZ, supra note 65, at 256. Raz said, "[t]he importance of liberal rights is in their
service to the public good .... [O]ne reason for affording special protection to individual
interests is that thereby one also protects a collective good, an aspect of public culture." Id.
187. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall's words in Marbury do not
support the results of Feres, Chappell, and Stanley: "The very essence of civil liberty cer-
tainly consists in the right of every individual to claim protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection." Id. at
163.
188. Brodsky, Chappell v. Wallace: A Bivens Answer to a Political Question, 35 NAvAL L.
REv. 1, 25 (1986). A discussion of the scope of such judicial review of constitutional torts is
beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the scope of and limitations on judicial
review, see id. at 40-46; Howland, supra note 114, at 149-53; Comment, Constitutional Tort
Remedies: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L. REv. 492,
499-511 (1980); Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of "Inci-
dent to Service," 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 485, 504-14 (1982); Note, Intramilitary Tort Law,
supra note 24, at 1010-16; see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (for the proposition that the Constitution intended the
courts to be the branch of government that is primarily responsible for enforcing the Bill of
Rights).
189. Hirschhorn, supra note 62 at 214. Hirschhorn states:
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Allowing suits against the military for constitutional torts will
make constitutional violations by the military less likely by incul-
cating military superiors with fundamental values through the
sanctioning of behavior that is not consistent with those values.
According to Professor Howland:
[T]ort jurisprudence emphasizes dominant American values and at-
tempts to reinforce them. All personal tort liability buttresses con-
cern for equality, freedom, and individual worth, because its focus is
on the person.
The allowance of intramilitary tort suits would transfer those val-
ues to the military and ... would thereby promote civilian internal
control of the military. Actions for negligent, intentional, and consti-
tutional torts each implicate particular values whose transfer to the
military would enhance this desired control.
Constitutional torts are most likely to transfer dominant civilian
values to the military because constitutional standards reflect fun-
damental notions of equality, freedom, and individual worth.""
Feres, Chappell, and Stanley do not honor either a rights-based
jurisprudence or a utilitarian one. Because the Supreme Court in-
correctly perceives servicemembers as separate and apart from the
rest of society, these cases transform those who are sworn to up-
hold the fundamental moral values of our country and our Consti-
tution into second class citizens who cannot enforce their own con-
stitutional rights. Further, this lack of respect for servicemembers
and their rights fails to reinforce those fundamental values in mili-
tary superiors and may lead to abuses against society in general as
well as against servicemembers. Allowing the military to flout a
servicemember's constitutional rights with impunity establishes a
The common core of these principles [fundamental individual rights] . . . is the
moral conception that "government must treat those whom it governs with concern,
that is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with re-
spect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent
conceptions of how their lives should be lived." This is said to be the ruling principle
of the system of government established by the Constitution; it justifies both democ-
racy and the use of judicial review to check the tendency of democracy to violate
fundamental rights.
Id. at 232 (quoting DWORKMN, supra note 62, at 135-37).
190. Howland, supra note 114, at 144. Speaking of discrimination suits, Professor Howl-
and noted that they "transfer the value of equality in two ways: they enforce the general
concepts of individual equality, freedom and individual worth; and they enforce the inclu-
sion of an excluded group's perspective in the definition of the activity and dominant val-
ues." Id. at 145.
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dangerous precedent. As Thomas Paine said, "[h]e that would
make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from op-
pression; for if he violates that duty he establishes a precedent that
will reach himself."''" If the military must guard its enemies from
oppression, a priori, it must guard its own from oppression. And
even if the military fails in this regard, the courts cannot.
VII. CONCLUSION
With these cases, beginning with Feres, going through Chappell,
and culminating in Stanley, the Supreme Court did not further
the utilitarian goals it used as the justification for each of its hold-
ings. Rather than advancing the public good, these decisions
harmed the government's defense efforts and failed to accomplish
any of the goals of public tort law. In addition, the Court violated
jurisprudential theory by harming both the rights of ser-
vicemembers and harming the society they protect. The words of
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Solorio v. United States,192 equally
apply to Stanley: "The Court's action ... reflects contempt, both
for the members of our armed forces and for the constitutional
safeguards intended to protect us all."' 93
191. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 81, n.42 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 THE
COMPLETE WRrTINGS OF THOMAS PAYNE 588 (Foner ed. 1945)).
192. 483 U.S. 435, 452 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 467.
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